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Blue States, Red States:  The United States?* 
CATHERINE POWELL†  
INTRODUCTION 
This essay focuses on the role of states, cities, and other 
subnational jurisdictions (collectively “localities”) in local 
incorporation of international law norms aimed at protecting the 
climate and immigrants.  As a case study, this essay considers local 
innovation in climate and immigration policy in the United States 
within the twin concepts of federalism and glocalization—the 
interaction between “global scripts” and “local norms.”1  In a parallel 
project, I analyze climate change and immigration in developing a 
 
© 2020 Catherine Powell. 
* In Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential election victory speech, he reiterated an idea he 
had popularized: “Americans sent a message to the world that we have never been [just a 
collection of individuals or] a collection of red states and blue states. We are, and always will 
be, the United States of America.” Barack Obama, President-Elect, 2008 Presidential Victory 
Speech (Nov. 4, 2008) (transcript available on National Public Radio website), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96624326. 
† Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; White House National Security 
Council Director for Human Rights (on detail 2011); Secretary of State Policy Planning Staff 
(2009-12). 
For feedback on an earlier draft of this essay, the author would like to thank the conveners 
of and participants in the University of Milan, European Discussion Group on “Constitutional 
Principle or Political Process? The Future of Federalism in Comparative Perspective” 
(October 2019). I also want to express gratitude to my research assistant at Fordham Law 
School, Mary Katherine Cunningham. Finally, as this essay is going to press, the COVD-19 
pandemic has ravaged communities across the globe, posing enormous challenges for 
governance at every level. While I am not able to account for these challenges in this essay—
other than identifying avenues for potential future research in the conclusion—I dedicate this 
essay to those whose lives were lost during the pandemic and the loved ones they leave behind. 
 1.  See Roland Robertson, Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity, 
in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 25, 28 (Michael Featherstone et al. eds., 1995); see also John 
Gillespie, Developing a Framework for Understanding the Localisation of Global Scripts in 
East Asia, in THEORISING THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 209, 209 n.2 (Andrew Halpin & Volker 
Roeben eds., 2009) (defining “global scripts” as “the globalization of norms, standards, 
principles and rules”). 
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theory about federalism to justify lawmaking from above and below 
the nation-state as a critical role in addressing national political market 
failures—particularly when: (1)  underrepresented minorities 
are systematically locked out of the political process (as immigrants 
quintessentially are) or, by contrast, (2) influential 
minorities can externalize the costs of their negative conduct through 
regulatory capture (as the fossil fuel sector in the climate context).2  
The present essay builds on that project, but investigates a 
different dynamic.  Taking as a given my point about the circumstances 
justifying local innovation to address particular failures of national 
politics, this essay looks to the process of transplanting legal norms 
across jurisdictions—horizontally and vertically.  Since my starting 
point is that local innovation and transplantation of innovative ideas is 
useful under defined circumstances, this essay takes a closer look at 
the efficacy of federalism and glocalization as processes for tipping 
norms and creating norm cascades3 to address the negative 
distributional consequences of national policies.   
In examining the political geography of debates on climate and 
immigration law, this essay explores how both federalism and (its 
close cousin) glocalization serve as mechanisms for not only managing 
and shaping polite disagreement, but sharpening and consolidating 
forceful resistance to significant threats to rule of law we face today.  
More generally, political polarization and the “Big Sort” have resulted 
in a divide between blue states and red states on a range of issues.4  
 
 2. Portions of this Essay are substantially drawn from my earlier, parallel project. See 
Catherine Powell, We the People: These United Divided States, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 
2690 (2019) (adapting John Hart Ely’s concept of judicial review, which focuses on horizontal 
separation of powers, to develop a theory of federalism, that is, vertical separation of powers).  
For further discussion of the broader normative framework, see also JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1980) (Ely famously notes: Malfunction 
occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels 
of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though, no 
one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are 
systematically disadvantaging some minority[.]).  See also Nestor Davidson, The Dilemma of 
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L. J. 956, 960-62 (2019) (articulating parallel 
theory that involves intertwining structure and normativity in determining when local 
innovation is warranted). 
 3.  Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 893 (1998).  
 4.  See generally Bill Bishop & Robert Cushing, The Big Sort: Migration, Economy and 
Politics in the United States of “Those people”, (Feb. 29, 2008), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/0228_america_bishopppt.pdf 
(describing trend for more people to live in proximity to others with similar views). Thanks to 
Vicki Jackson for drawing my attention to this book. Vicki C. Jackson, The Democratic Deficit 
of United States Federalism? Red State, Blue State, Purple?, 46 Fed. L. Rev. 645, 662 n.76, 
663 (2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0067205X1804600410. As 
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What is particularly interesting about the climate change and 
immigration disputes is that they are both inherently transnational 
matters (regarding, respectively, the future of the planet and the global 
labor supply).5  
On the climate side, in the wake of President Trump’s 
announcement in summer of 2017 that he will withdraw the United 
States from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, California 
Governor Jerry Brown called on the President to fight climate change 
or to “get out of the way” while the rest of the world works to reduce 
emissions and invest in clean energy.6  Similarly, former New York 
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, now a UN Special Envoy for Cities 
and Climate Change, said, “If Washington won’t lead, the mayors and 
governors will.”7  Indeed, Trump’s plans to withdraw has not only met 
with widespread criticism and derision abroad and at home, it arguably 
sparked greater action, with numerous U.S. mayors and governors 
pledging to meet emissions-reductions goals outlined in the 
agreement.8    
 
Professor Jackson notes, some disagree with Bishop’s analysis. See Id. at 662 n.76; see also 
Samuel J. Abrams & Morris Fiorina, The Myth of the “Big Sort”, HOOVER DIGEST (Aug. 13, 
2012), https://www.hoover.org/research/myth-big-sort. 
 5.  What is often referred to as the “immigration” debate also implicates political 
refugees—along with economic (or labor) migrants—to the extent we can draw a line between 
the two categories. President Trump has sought to eviscerate who counts as a refugee as well, 
by: narrowing who qualifies for refugee status (through eliminating domestic violence-based 
asylum, for example); lowering the refugee admissions ceiling; stopping refugees before they 
arrive at the U.S. southern border (through designating Mexico a “safe third country” under a 
new “third-country asylum rule); and restricting public assistance to foreign-born legal 
residents. For further discussion on how Trump uses not only race, but gender tropes to restrict 
immigration and asylum protections, See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Race, Gender, and Nation 
in an Age of Shifting Borders, UCLA J. of INT’L L. & FOR’N AFF. 133 (2020). 
 6.  The Latest: Jerry Brown to Trump: “Get out of the way,” THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://apnews.com/1098c54326f14a61b149e4e2030a40f4. 
 7.  Jonathan Watts, Alternative US group honouring Paris climate accord demands ‘seat 
at the table’ – The America Pledge group claims to represent US majority opinion on carbon 
emissions, despite Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/11/alternative-us-group-
honouring-paris-climate-accord-demands-seat-at-the-table-bonn. 
 8.  We might understand this reaction to Trump’s threatened withdrawal within the 
context of the literature on backlash, even though the response here is to the White House, not 
a court decision. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can 
Support Democracy By Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J 1279, 1326 (2005) 
(arguing that courts should avoid rulings like Roe v. Wade and Bowers v. Hardwick because 
of backlash, where Roe forced traditionalists to exit American politics, while Bowers 
prevented gays from entering it); see generally Michael J. Klareman, How Brown Changed 
Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM HIST. 81 (1994) (analyzing backlash to Brown); 
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991) 
(discussing backlash against Roe v. Wade and attributing the birth of the Moral Majority to the 
case). But see Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
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On the immigration side, a similar dynamic is playing out, where 
Trump has vowed to “end” sanctuary jurisdictions, which extend 
varying levels of protection (or “sanctuary”) to immigrants.  Despite 
Trump’s threats to cut these jurisdictions off from federal funding for 
failure to cooperate with his draconian deportation policies,9 a growing 
number of state and local governments are refusing to participate in the 
enforcement of federal immigration law by disentangling their 
criminal justice systems from the federal immigration regime.  Rather 
than using an era of mass incarceration to facilitate a new era of mass 
deportation, these jurisdictions have adopted a set of reforms to protect 
immigrants from deportation when they interact with the criminal 
justice system.10   
While Donald Trump remains a huge obstacle to protecting the 
climate and immigrants, localities in the United States are playing a 
large role in adopting protective measures—encouraging other 
subnational jurisdictions to do the same and building support for these 
norms across the country for potential uptake by national leaders in the 
future.  Scholarly analyses of such bottom-up governance fits within 
the trend toward popular constitutionalism that has become widespread 
among constitutional law theorists,11 as well as the embrace of 
devolution and decentralized authority which animate core doctrine in 
international law.12  
 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (2007) (responding to Eskridge, Klareman, and 
Sunstein and proposing a theory about democratic constitutionalism to rebut concerns about 
backlash). 
 9.  Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 10.  See generally Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities, 58 B.C. 
L. REV. 1703 (2018). 
 11.  See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (Oxford Univ. Press 
2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1999).  
 12.  See, e.g., Oslo, The Principle of Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction for Core International Crimes, FORUM FOR INT’L HUMAN. L. (Sept. 4, 2009), 
https://www.fichl.org/activities/the-principle-of-complementarity-and-the-exercise-of-
universal-jurisdiction-for-core-international-crimes/ (“The complementarity principle on 
which the International Criminal Court (ICC) is based entails that the ICC can only investigate 
and prosecute core international crimes when national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to 
do so genuinely”); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, EURO. GOV. PAPERS 
(2007) (noting, “Subsidiarity in this architecture implies that in writing framework rules the 
lower-level units should be given sufficient autonomy in implementing the rules to be able to 
propose changes to them”) (citing EU scholar, Gráinne de Búrca).  
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I. GLOCALIZATION IN AN AGE OF TRUMP  
As an entanglement process between global scripts and local 
norms, glocalization is not necessarily a one-way process, “but rather 
is a mutual interactive process among different” sites.13  Scholars have 
described this interaction as “dialogue,”14 the “diffusion of law,”15 or a 
“‘creole’ situation bounded by the macro flow of normative ideas 
through various legal traditions.”16  Beyond involving a mere drawing 
down or uncritical transmission of norms, at its best, glocalization 
allows for critical engagement with new norms, so community 
members can remake and translate law to fit their own circumstances.17 
The climate and immigration debates reflect this critical 
engagement.  While these debates largely map onto the blue state/red 
state divide, localities adopting legal policies to protect the 
environment and immigrants are often grounded in local, pragmatic 
“states’ rights” and “local sovereignty” concerns—values often 
embraced by conservatives.  At the same time, subnational climate and 
immigration policy innovation reflects local manifestations of the 
international realities of a warming planet and the rights of individuals, 
regardless of status. Even if not self-styled as part of “The Resistance” 
to Donald Trump’s “America First” perspective,18 these local policies 
 
 13.  Fan Kun, Globalization of Arbitration: Transnational Standards Struggling with 
Local Norms Through the Lens of Arbitration Transplantation in China, 18 HARV. NEGOT. 
L.J. 175, 186 (2013). 
 14.  See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004) (on “dialogue” among judges of different nations). 
 15.  William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 
& UNOFFICIAL L. (2004). 
 16.  See Kun, supra note 13.   
 17.  For a discussion of the importance of translation, rather than mere transmission of 
law, see Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and 
Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 331, 375 (2005-
2006); see Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law and Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 504-05 (2000); see also Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 
NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional 
Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
245, 251 (2001) (arguing that the translation metaphor is particularly well-suited to the U.S. 
context because it describes the foreignness that many Americans associate with international 
law); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1401, 1444 (2003) (describing 
translation as a core empowerment strategy used by feminists in Muslim countries where 
women are reconceiving human rights in ways that are relevant to their particular local 
religious and cultural contexts). 
 18.  I am not referring to Trump’s “America First” slogan as “nationalist,” because the 
slogan itself is a distortion of what policies are truly in the United States’ interest, even on 
realist grounds. Elsewhere, I (and many other scholars) have discussed how U.S. interests are 
not fixed, but constantly reshaped and redefined through interaction with other states and 
international institutions (per the constructivist theory of international relations theory). See 
generally Hans Peter Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Human Rights”, in 
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are often geared toward disentanglement from federal government 
policies that advance the President’s climate denialism and anti-
immigrant stance.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, emboldened 
in part by Trump’s narrow populist cri de coeur, other subnational 
jurisdictions have adopted or even doubled-down on the President’s 
policies, in some instances setting up a direct clash between red states 
(such as Texas) and blue cities (such as Austin).19 
Rather than characterize this clash as a divide between globalists 
and nationalists, this essay views the climate and immigration debates 
as disagreements about nation—what type of nation the United States 
is (and is becoming) internally and how to project U.S. leadership 
externally with regard to existential questions concerning the future of 
the planet and the future of humanity.  As regards the future of the 
planet (and the role of the United States in it), recent UN and U.S. 
government reports indicate that the effects of climate change are 
likely to become dire by 2040, far earlier than previously thought, if 
greenhouse gas emissions (and the resulting warming of the 
atmosphere) continue at the current rate, unless rapid steps are taken 
to transform the world’s economy.20  As regards the future of our role 
as humans, while Trump blames immigrants for “taking your jobs,”21 
many studies indicate that the workplace is on the cusp of 
transformation involving large scale job displacement as a result of 
technology and automation of jobs, due to the rise of artificial 
intelligence.22  If Trump were truly concerned about jobs, this is the 
 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. 
Simmons eds. 2013).  
 19.  For discussion of anti-sanctuary localism, see generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, et 
al., State Anti-Sanctuary & Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (2019).  
 20.  Coral Davenport, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early 
as 2040, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-
climate-report-2040.html (reporting on UN reports findings and recommendations, including 
necessary steps to address climate change – such as reducing carbon dioxide emissions – but 
speculating that such measures are politically impossible under Trump). See also Coral 
Davenport & Kendra Pierre-Louis, U.S. Climate Report Warns of Damaged Environment and 
Shrinking Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/23/climate/us-climate-report.html (reporting that “if 
significant steps are not taken to rein in global warming, the damage will knock as much as 
10 percent off the size of the American economy by century’s end… American exports and 
supply chains could be disrupted, agricultural yields could fall to 1980s levels by midcentury 
and fire season could spread to the Southeast”). 
 21.  Donald Trump, CPAC Speech (Mar. 6, 2014) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-immigrants-are-taking-your-
jobs/2014/03/06/6998bb82-a576-11e3-b865-38b254d92063_video.html. 
 22.  MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a 
Time of Automation, at 51 (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/future%20of%20organiz
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challenge he would be focused on, not immigrants. 
The climate and immigration debates reflect ways that 
glocalization involves not only a drawing down of global norms to the 
local, but also a scaling up and diffusion of norms across jurisdictions.  
As one scholar notes: “On the one hand, global processes are 
incorporated into the local setting—‘localized globalism’ or ‘micro-
globalization.’  On the other hand, local ideals, practices, and 
institutions are also projected onto global scenes— “globalized 
localism” or “macro-localization.”23 
Federalism scholars have made similar observations, using 
concepts such as “iterative federalism”24 to describe how localities can 
scale-up innovation, spurring the federal government to act (and vice 
versa).  Even though U.S. Supreme Court precedent tells us that the 
federal government has authority over environmental and immigration 





(reporting that up to 30 percent of jobs may be displaced by 2030, though many jobs will be 
created – perhaps more than will be lost, but will require reskilling and retraining); Illanes, et 
al., Retraining and Reskilling Workers in an Age of Automation, MCKINSEY GLOBAL 
INSTITUTE (Jan. 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-
work/retraining-and-reskilling-workers-in-the-age-of-automation?cid=eml-web (indicating 
that “in terms of magnitude, [this transition] is akin to coping with the large-scale shift from 
agricultural work to manufacturing that occurred in the early 20th century in North America and 
Europe, and more recently in China.”).  
 23.  Fan Kun, Glocalization of Arbitration at 253-54. 
 24.  Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1099 (2009). 
 25.  Regarding environment law, the Supreme Court upheld the federal government 
authority in regulating the environment based on the role of the national government as a 
sovereign nation involved in negotiating the global commons with other nations, rejecting a 
10th Amendment challenge. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Similarly, 
immigration is understood to be bound up in the federal government’s control over matters 
related to sovereignty and foreign affairs. See generally Jennifer Gordon, Immigration as 
Commerce: A New Look at the Federal Immigration Power and the Constitution, 93 IND. L.J. 
653 (2018). 
 26.  Regarding environment law, see, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524-25 
(2007) (agreeing with Massachusetts and the other states, the Court found the federal EPA’s 
rationale for not regulating particular greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under the 
Clean Air Act to be inadequate and required the agency to articulate a reasonable basis in order 
to avoid regulation). Regarding immigration law, see, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 
F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (granting preliminary injunction and finding likelihood 
of success on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim that President Trump’s Executive Order 13758 
(threatening to defund “sanctuary jurisdictions”) is unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
violates both horizontal and vertical separation of powers concerns). The Northern District of 
California also denied a renewed motion to dismiss from the government, holding the city of 
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The current context calls for urgent analysis of the possibilities 
for interaction between local and global, given the rise of President 
Donald Trump, who regularly assaults the independence of the 
judiciary and the press, checks and balances, rule of law, the rights of 
minorities and women, transparency and truth, and other fundamental 
pillars of democracy.  Growing out of the western enlightenment 
period, the American and French revolutions popularized these 
essential constitutional guarantees, which were eventually 
internationalized and universalized through the global human rights 
movement in the aftermath of World War II.27  
II. CLIMATE CHANGE 
Trump’s vow to withdraw from the Paris climate accord 
galvanized bottom-up local climate policy innovation.  While localities 
have long played a role in local environmental concerns, such as 
pollution-control, the 2018 National Climate Assessment confirms, “a 
growing number of states, cities, and businesses have pursued or 
deepened initiatives aimed at reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions.”28  
Local innovation with climate policy is not only drawing down on 
international climate commitments, but is also being channeled back 
up through participation in global meetings and bi-lateral negotiations 
between U.S. localities and foreign governments, given that the green 
economy is seen as a profitable market for many localities worldwide.29  
 
San Francisco had demonstrated a "real and immediate controversy" between itself and the 
federal government. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 267 F.Supp.3d 1201, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). Note that the Trump administration has also sued California, claiming that California 
sanctuary laws “reflect a deliberate effort by California to obstruct the United States’ 
enforcement of federal immigration law.” See Katie Benner & Jennifer Medina, Trump 
Administration Sues California Over Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/us/politics/justice-department-california-sanctuary-
cities.html. The Eastern District of California has granted in part and denied in part the United 
States’ motion for preliminary injunction, in a case which, at the time of this writing, is 
pending certiorari per the Trump administration’s request. See generally United States v. 
California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and 
remanded, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 207 L. ed. 2d 1072 (2020). 
 27.  See LOUIS HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 21-25 (1979). More broadly, U.S. 
leadership helped pave the way for the establishment of modern international law and 
institutions, following the war, which laid the foundation for international legal principles 
concerning the environment and basic human rights for all, regardless of status. 
 28.  U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROG., Fourth Nat’l Climate Assmt., Chapter 29, at 1347 
(2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch29_Mitigation_Full.pdf. 
 29.  See generally Powell, supra note 4, at 2705-14 (discussing how the Paris Climate 
Accord facilitates this form of bottom up lawmaking). 
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In fact, state and local governments in the United States, across 
party lines, have a long history of involvement in addressing climate 
change and in spurring the federal government to act through a form 
of iterative federalism.30  Because of the problems of traffic and smog 
in the Los Angeles area, California had an early incentive to act in 
ways that few other states did. In 1967, then California State Governor 
Ronald Reagan signed legislation paving the way for the state to 
strictly curb auto vehicle emissions.31  
While a strong federal role can address the tragedy of the 
commons problem in environmental law, climate change is also a 
tipping problem.32  Given that states, such as California in the 
automobile context (and Gulf states in the context of rising sea levels 
and the problem of flooding), are affected by climate change in 
disparate ways, certain states in fact do have incentives to be first 
movers to address local issues with global dimensions. 
Congress had preempted other states from adopting “any standard 
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,” but it 
exempted California.33  In effect, the federal government quasi-
deputized California as a “superregulator,” wherein other states could 
chose to follow the federal or the California standard.34  Because 
California has the largest automobile market in the country, most 
manufacturers opt to follow the California (more stringent) standard.  
As a laboratory of experimentation, California was able to take on the 
risks (and enjoy the benefits) of innovation.  By allowing California to 
experiment, some costly missteps were limited to one jurisdiction, 
providing opportunities for learning and improvement as policy 
innovation was taken up at the federal level.35  The Obama 
administration provided a waiver for California’s progressively more 
stringent auto emission standards.  
While Trump announced he was revoking the Obama waiver, 
 
 30.  Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW L. REV. 1097, 1100 
(2009). 
 31.  Jody Freeman, Trump’s Biggest Climate Move Yet is Bad for Everyone, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/opinion/trumps-biggest-climate-move-
yet-is-bad-for-
everyone.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer. 
 32.  Thomas E. Hale, Catalytic Institutions for the Global Commons: Tragedy or Tipping 
Point?, PERRY WORLD HOUSE & UNIV. PA., at 16 (2017), 
https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/halepaper.original.pdf.  
 33.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1857f-1(a), 1857f-6(a) (Supp. IV. 1965-1968) (1967 amendment to the 
Clean Air Act); see Carlson, supra note 26, at 1111. 
 34.  Carlson, supra note 24, at 1100. 
 35.  Id. at 1137-38. 
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California (and 23 other states) have filed suit against the revocation.36  
Trump’s proposal to revoke the waiver sets the stage for a legal 
conflict that could split the nation’s auto market in two—“[o]ne for 
California and the dozen other aligned states that account for one-third 
of the U.S. auto market, and another for the rest of the country”37 – a 
situation that auto company executives themselves want to avoid.38  
A. Localities to Trump: “Get Out of the Way” 
Since President Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the 
Paris climate accord, state and local engagement in global 
environmental governance is on the rise in a visible, coordinated, 
networked fashion.  By attending international meetings of states-
parties to the Paris agreement (and through their actions and statements 
at home), state and local government officials have pledged to fight for 
the commitments the United States made through the Paris process—
in the absence of federal leadership (and more to the point, in the 
presence of federal hostility).  
In so doing, these state and local leaders are embracing a shared 
community (at least concerning our shared planet and climate) that is 
both local and global—and that concerns “We the People” today and 
“We the People” tomorrow (future generations).  Thus, these 
commitments are being made not only transnationally, but trans-
temporally.  These leaders are forcefully rebutting the efforts of 
powerful economic interests to externalize their responsibility for the 
costs of climate change to the rest of us, both at home and abroad, for 
today’s and future generations.  While state and local officials ground 
their primary concerns in their unique local pragmatic priorities, these 
leaders have also linked these very concrete concerns to the global 
(indeed planetary) phenomenon of climate change and the recognition 
that we are all in this together (in a quite existential way) and depend 
on cooperation with each other. 
Localities became visibly more engaged in global governance 
 
 36.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Cal., et al. v. Chao, et al., (2019) 
(No. 1:19-cv-02826). 
 37.  Tony Barboza, California counters Trump on car emissions standards, expands other 
climate rules, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
carbon-fuels-20180928-story.html. 
 38.  See Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Unveils Its Plan to Relax Car Pollution 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/climate/trump-auto-
emissions-california.html (The Trump administration “proposal goes much further than many 
major automakers wanted, and manufacturers are now worried that years of legal challenges 
and regulatory uncertainty could complicate their business.”).  
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during the December 2017 UN climate talks in Bonn, Germany—a 
meeting marking the second anniversary of the Paris accord.  The 
White House sent a small delegation to in Bonn climate talks, 
Germany.39  While the official U.S. delegation scheduled a meeting to 
discuss the future of coal, an alternative, high-level, bi-partisan 
coalition, including California Governor Jerry Brown, former New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and several senators, mayors, 
and business leaders, launched the “America Pledge” report.40  
Demanding a “seat at the table” in Bonn, Bloomberg—who is also a 
UN special enjoy for cities and climate change—said of the America 
Pledge group, “If this group were a country, we’d be the third-biggest 
economy in the world.”41  Citing recent violent wildfires in California 
as an example of extreme weather made worse by human-made climate 
change, Governor Brown noted that “the fires are burning in California 
[and] [t]hey’ll be burning in France, burning all around the world” if 
countries fail to reduce emissions.42  
That same month, in another bi-partisan initiative, led by Chicago 
Mayor Rahm Emmanuel, more than fifty mayors from across the 
United States and Canada participated in the North American Climate 
Summit in Chicago.  The group of mayors signed “an official 
agreement, the Chicago Climate Charter, in which they pledged to 
meet the emissions-reduction goals set out by the Paris agreement.”43 
In September 2018, California Governor Brown hosted a 
 
 39.  See Umair Irfan, The Trump Administration went to the UN climate talks to promote 
coal, VOX (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2017/11/14/16634480/us-coal-nuclear-climate-change-cop23-protest (In fact, 
“rather than sending high-level Cabinet secretaries to the meeting as the Obama White House 
did, the U.S. delegation is being led by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas 
A. Shannon, Jr.”).  
 40.  Jonathan Watts, Alternative US group honouring Paris climate accord demands ‘seat 
at the table’ – The America Pledge group claims to represent US majority opinion on carbon 
emissions, despite Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/11/alternative-us-group-honouring-
paris-climate-accord-demands-seat-at-the-table-bonn. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  The Associated Press, The Latest: Jerry Brown to Trump: “Get out of the way,” ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2017), https://apnews.com/1098c54326f14a61b149e4e2030a40f4. For 
analysis of other ways that state and local governments have played a role in advancing 
international environmental and other policy goals, see, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF 
MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, RISING CITIES (Yale Univ. Press) 
(2013). 
 43.  Jeremy Berke, More than 50 US mayors just signed a charter to meet the Paris 
agreement goals without Trump, THE BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/paris-agreement-2-year-anniversary-us-mayors-step-up-
2017-12. 
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domestic climate change conference in San Francisco, featuring 
representatives of sub-national governments, businesses, investors, 
musicians, and others to highlight action that could “spur deeper 
commitment” from national governments to fight global warming.44 A 
coalition of 16 states, Puerto Rico, hundreds of cities, and almost 2,000 
businesses have pledged to ensure that the United States meets former 
President Obama’s Paris pledge to cut greenhouse gas emissions 26 to 
28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.45  However, the group has 
acknowledged that “United States emissions are on track to fall only 
about 17 percent over that span” and that these “states and cities would 
have to pursue ambitious new policies [] to get closer to the target” and 
persuade “several other states beyond the blue coastal enclaves to join 
them[.]”46  
Even so, California Governor Brown has met with China’s chief 
climate negotiator and “announced plans for California and China to 
work together on zero-emissions vehicles and fuel-cell research[,]” 
and “several blue-state governors met behind closed doors with the 
environment ministers of Canada and Mexico to forge new 
partnerships on issues like electric vehicles and curbing emissions of 
methane[.]”47  While it is unusual for American governors to, in effect, 
take the lead on international climate diplomacy, Canada’s Minister of 
Environment and Climate Change notes, “It is important to show the 
world that we’re still working with U.S. states,” and that “[t]here really 
are practical things we can do together.”48 
B. Protecting the Climate as a Tipping Problem 
In considering the diffusion of policies aimed at climate change, 
it is tempting to view the norm cascade sweeping through at least some 
 
 44.  Mythili Sampathkumar, California launches new climate change conference to help 
fulfill Paris Agreement targets – The U.S. is withdrawing from the deal, but states and cities 
vow to continue fighting global warming, THE INDEPENDENT (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world-0/us-politics/california-climate-change-
conference-paris-agreement-deal-targets-a7828076.html. Along with Governors from New 
York, Maryland and Connecticut, Governor Brown’s team said they would work on new 
regulations to restrict hydrofluorocarbons, extremely potent greenhouse gasses used in air-
conditioners and refrigerators. See Brad Plumer, California Had Its Own Climate Summit. 
Now What?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/15/climate/california-climate-summit.html (noting “In 
2016, nations agreed on a treaty to phase out these gases, but Mr. Trump has not submitted the 
pact for ratification or written federal regulations.”). 
 45.  See Plumer, supra note 45. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id.  
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localities as motivated by a common purpose.  Under the standard 
tragedy of the commons analysis, we may assume that all jurisdictions 
have similar, if not identical, motives.49  However, the fact that certain 
jurisdictions have been first and more aggressive movers in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, such as California, indicates different 
interests and motives. 
As international relations Professor Thomas Hale explains, 
certain mitigation steps taken by particular jurisdictions may not even 
be viewed as primarily climate policy per se:50  “[Rather,] [m]any ‘co-
benefits’ can be gained [] including reducing local air pollution and 
improving human health, increasing energy security and reliability, 
developing new industrial sectors, preserving forests, [reducing 
traffic,] ideational preferences, such as the value of upholding a ‘green’ 
policy[.]”51   
For these reasons, it makes sense to assess climate policy not only 
within the framework of the standard tragedy of the commons analysis, 
but also to recognize that climate policy involves a “tipping problem 
structure.”52  While Hale makes this point in the context of tipping 
norms globally, I am adapting his insight applies with equal force 
domestically. 
In sum, the initiative of state and local governments in addressing 
environmental protection concerns, such as climate change, is critical.  
Certainly the federal government has an important coordination role to 
play.  But, in the meantime, the leadership of subfederal government 
actors can build support for climate change policy across the nation 
and, eventually, at the national level. 
III. SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS 
A parallel bottom-up approach has unfolded in U.S. immigration 
policy in the context of state, counties, and cities that have developed 
“sanctuary” policies for immigrants.  The term “sanctuary jurisdiction” 
is itself somewhat of a misnomer today, in the sense that it now applies 
to a range of localities motivated by a variety of concerns beyond the 
original ones in the 1980s that were more geared toward providing true 
 
 49.  See Hale, supra note 32. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 2. 
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sanctuary from deportation.53 
Unlike the climate context, international law norms protecting the 
rights of immigrants are weak.54  During the first wave of sanctuary 
policies – which was largely focused on political refugees (where 
international law protections are stronger) in contrast to economic 
migrants – sanctuary cities were in fact responding to what they 
perceived as the federal government’s lack of compliance with 
international law, based on the U.S. government’s rejection of refugee 
applications from Central Americans.55  Along with the emergence of 
these early sanctuary cities, religious activists in the church-centered 
movement drew on the emerging use of international human rights 
norms by U.S. advocates more broadly, invoking the principles of 
personal accountability developed in the Nuremburg tribunals, to 
justify what the federal government considered alien smuggling.56  But 
the more recent waves of sanctuary policies have focused on 
immigrants (not necessarily more narrowly on refugees), where there 
is a dearth of binding international legal protections. 
A. Typology of Sanctuary Policies aimed at Disentanglement  
A study of over 3,000 counties identifies seven different types of 
sanctuary policies.57  As counties become either increasingly or 
 
 53.  American Immigration Council, Fact Sheet: Understanding Trust Acts, Community 
Policing, and “Sanctuary Cities,” (Oct. 10, 2015), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/sanctuary-cities-trust-acts-and-
community-policing-explained. 
 54.  See Catherine Powell, We the People: These United Divided States, 40 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2685, 2689 (2019). 
 55.  See Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a Sanctuary?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 142-43 (2008) 
(discussing that in the 1980s, municipalities – which we now refer to as “sanctuary cities” – 
adopted non-cooperation policies alongside churches that provided safe havens to Central 
American migrants).   
 56.  Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION 
POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-
and-asylum-policy-reagan-era; see also Catherine Powell, The United Divided States:  San 
Francisco Sues Donald Trump for Sanctuary Cities Order, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/37589/united-divided-states-san-francisco-sues-donald-trump-
sanctuary-cities-order/. 
 57.  See Immigration Legal Resource Center, The Rise of Sanctuary: Getting Local 
Officers Out of the Business of Deportations in the Trump Era, IMMIGR. LEGAL RESOURCE 
CTR. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/rise_of_sanctuary-lg-
20180201.pdf (surveying 3,015 of the 3,140 countries and county equivalents in the United 
States) [hereinafter ILRC, The Rise of Sanctuary]; see also Christopher N. Lasch, et al., 
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 58 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1723-36 (describing similar “types 
of criminal justice policies that cities have adopted to disentangle their law enforcement 
systems from federal immigration enforcement”). Note also that the Congressional Research 
Service describes a useful typology by noting that sanctuary policies are often described as 
falling under one of three categories: First, so-called “don’t enforce” policies generally bar the 
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decreasingly disengaged from the federal immigration enforcement 
regime, collectively, these counties could overtime tip these norms in 
one way or another.  The findings here illustrates trends that are 
corroborated through qualitative research concerning the emergence of 
a network of sanctuary jurisdictions that influence one another.58  By 
adopting sanctuary policies—and “dissenting by deciding,” to use 
Heather Gerken’s formulation59—“these multiple points of sanctuary 
allow their specific constituencies, as well as broader local, state, and 
national ones, to weigh competing conceptions of rule of law, moral 
legitimacy, public safety outcomes, and social justice[.]”60 
My description here begins with the category of sanctuary 
policies that seek the least amount of disentanglement from the federal 
immigration enforcement apparatus (and are the most common).  The 
subsequent categories discussed move up a spectrum of increasing 
disengagement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
(with data referring to 2017, unless otherwise indicated): 
 Refusal to enter into 287(g) agreements: Ninety-eight percent of 
counties did not have a 287(g) agreements with the federal 
government.61  The 287(g) program involves an optional agreement 
between the jurisdiction and ICE, which essentially deputizes 
particular local law enforcement agents to enforce immigration laws.  
Because such agreements are optional, it is fairly easy for counties to 
opt against entering into such agreements. 
No ICE Detention Contract: Nearly ninety-four percent of 
counties did not have a contract with ICE.62  Such ICE detention 
contracts are contracts between ICE and local jails, where ICE pays 
the jails to hold immigrants in detention during their deportation 
proceedings.  As with 287(g) agreements, entering into an ICE 
detention contract is also optional (though there are financial 
 
state or local police from assisting  federal immigration authorities. Second, “don’t ask” 
policies generally bar certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person’s immigration 
status. Third, “don’t tell” policies typically restrict information sharing between state or local 
law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. See Sarah S. Herman, State and Local 
“Sanctuary” Policies Limiting Participation in Immigration Enforcement, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE (March 23, 2017). 
 58.  Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. 
L. REV. 1209, 1251-52 (2019). 
 59.  Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1747-51 (2005); 
see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L. J. 1256, 1293-94 (2009). 
 60.  Villazor, et al., supra note 58, at 1276. 
 61.  ILRC, The Rise of Sanctuary, supra note 57, at 9.  
 62.  Id. 
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incentives to rent out space in local jails to ICE). 
Limits on ICE Detainers (ICE Holds): Twenty-four percent of 
counties have policies refusing to cooperate with ICE requests to hold 
individuals beyond their release date, which would provide ICE with 
additional time to take custody of these individuals—a practice 
numerous officials in these jurisdictions view (and some courts have 
held) violate the 4th Amendment rights of those detained.63 
Restricting notifications to ICE about information, such as 
release dates: Only six percent of counties had policies against sharing 
information about detainees, such as release dates, with ICE.64 ICE 
asks local agencies to provide advance notice of when immigrants will 
be released from custody, so that ICE can arrest these individuals upon 
release. 
Limiting ICE access to local jails and ICE interrogations of 
detainees: Only four percent of counties restrict ICE’s access to jails 
or have put in place safeguards on ICE’s ability to interrogate 
detainees.65 
Prohibiting inquiries into immigration status and/or place of 
birth: Only four percent of counties limit their officers from asking 
individuals about their immigration status.66  General bans on 
participating in immigration enforcement. Only four percent of 
countries have a general rule against spending time or resources on 
immigration enforcement.67 
B. What Motivates Sanctuary Policies  
 As with climate policy, jurisdictions have different motivations for 
adopting sanctuary policies,68 ranging from more pragmatic rationales 
to human rights-oriented considerations. 
1. Preserving Local Control over Criminal Justice  
One reason for sanctuary policies (for example, in New Haven, 
 
 63.  Id. at 9. 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 9. Such counties may require a judicial warrant for ICE to access limited areas 
or adopt procedural protections for imprisoned immigrants so that they can refuse 
interrogation by ICE agents. Id. at 4 
 66.  Id. at 9. 
 67.  See id. (this might include restrictions on participating in joint operations involving 
immigration enforcement). 
 68.  See Lasch, et al., supra note 10, at 1752-71. 
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Pittsburg, San Francisco) is to assert that state and local governments 
should be in control of criminal justice priorities, separate and apart 
from the federal government’s responsibilities over immigration 
enforcement.69  These “don’t enforce” policies bar local criminal law 
enforcement officials from federal civil immigration enforcement. 
Drawing the line between these two spheres of authority is supported 
by the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence concerning the Tenth 
Amendment. According to the Court’s anti-commandeering cases,70 
the federal government cannot compel state and local governments 
into participating in a federal regulatory program.  At the same time, 
criminal justice matters fall within the realm of traditional state and 
local police powers.71  
As the sanctuary policy in Cooks County, Illinois notes, “the 
federal government only reimburses part of the costs associated with 
ICE detainers”72—a classic concern of the Supreme Court’s anti-
commandeering jurisprudence.  Moreover, in considering whether ICE 
has violated the Fourth Amendment (by requesting that states and 
localities hold immigrants beyond the release dates), at least some 
courts have found that ICE detainer requests infringe on federalism and 
the Tenth Amendment concerns.73  Furthermore, courts have enjoined 
the provision in the President’s “sanctuary jurisdictions” Executive 
Order that threatens to cut off funds to such jurisdictions, citing the 
Spending Clause, reflecting Tenth Amendment concerns.74 
2. Enhancing Community Trust and Community Policing 
A second basis for sanctuary policies, which blends pragmatic 
and human rights considerations, is the concern that the entanglement 
of street-level policing in federal immigration enforcement 
undermines the trust that is necessary for community members to feel 
 
 69.  Id. at 1754-55.  
 70.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
 71.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“[t]he regulation and punishment 
of intrastate violence . . . has always been the province of the states”); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the prohibition on guns in school zones as “a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States”).  
 72.  Cook County, Ill. Ord. 11-O-73 (2011); see also Lasch, et al., supra note 10, at 1756, 
n 270 (discussing similar concerns expressed in the sanctuary policies of California, 
Philadelphia, PA, and Miami-Dade County). 
 73.  See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 74.  See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(granting preliminary injunction and finding likelihood of success on the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the EO is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates both horizontal 
and vertical separation of powers concerns). 
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confident in cooperating with local law enforcement.  A range of 
sanctuary jurisdictions, including California, Milwaukee County, and 
New Haven, have pointed to the importance of building community 
trust as rationales for disengaging with federal immigration efforts.75  
Trump’s hostile statements and policies toward immigrants have 
renewed fears in immigrant communities that interaction with local 
police (and other local authorities) will result in deportation.  
As many studies have demonstrated, “[c]ommunity trust is 
critical for effective policing programs.”76  Such fear “can cause 
immigrants and individual in mixed status families to refrain from 
coming forward as victims of, or witnesses to crime.”77  When reports 
of sexual assaults and spousal abuse dropped among Latinos, in 2017, 
the Los Angeles Police Department indicated that “deportation fears 
may be preventing Hispanic members of the community from 
reporting when they are victimized.”78  
3. Averting Unlawful Arrests 
A third ground for sanctuary policies, which also mixes pragmatic 
and human rights considerations, is the concern that unlawful arrests 
leads to legal and monetary liability.  This concern has paved the way 
for sanctuary policies in Oregon, Colorado, Washington, and 
California, which have each declared they would no longer consent to 
ICE detainer requests.79   Concerns about liability, as a result of 
entanglement with federal immigration enforcement, have grown with 
the emergence of crim-immigration. 
Furthermore, three lines of cases actually cabin the ability of 
states and localities to participate in making and enforcing immigration 
law.  First is Arizona v. United States,80 which struck down aspects of 
Arizona’s SB 1070 as preempted by federal immigration law.  A 
second line of cases reflects a concern that federal immigration 
detainers violate the Fourth Amendment.81  State and local law 
 
 75.  Lasch, et al., supra note 10, at 1761-64. 
 76.  Id. at 1761. 
 77.  Id. at 1762. See also Nik Theodore, Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of 
Police Involvement in Immigration Enforcement, POLICY LINK (May 2013), 
http://raceandpolicing.issuelab-dev.org/resources/15261/15261.pdf (reporting on the impact 
of police involvement in immigration enforcement on Latinos’ perceptions of public safety 
and their willingness to contact the police). 
 78.  News Release, L.A. Police Dep’t, Decline in Reporting of Crime Among Hispanic 
Population (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.lapdonline.org/home/news_view/61998.  
 79.  Lasch, et al., supra note 10, at 1758-61.  
 80.  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 81.  See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014); Miranda-Olivares 
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enforcement officials (such as, prominently, then-California State 
Attorney General Kamala Harris) have also expressed unease with 
federal detainer requests and that cooperation with such requests could 
expose states and localities to liability.82  A third line of cases “built on 
the notion, reflected in some sanctuary policies, that civil immigration 
arrests by local officials must not only be authorized by federal law but 
by state or local law as well.”83   
4. Securing Equal Protection 
A fourth reason for sanctuary policies—which focuses more 
directly and primarily on the question of human rights—is grounded 
in two concerns based on equal protection:  biased policing and 
discriminatory access to police services.84  Many jurisdictions—
including East Haven, New Orleans, and Vermont—have adopted 
sanctuary policies aimed at addressing these concerns.85  
Even where race or ethnicity is not an explicit factor, entangling 
police in immigration matters can incline officers to use race, ethnicity, 
and English-language ability as proxies for immigration status, for 
example, in determine who to stop, question, and investigate.86 Several 
sanctuary policies reflect a concern with fair, nondiscriminatory 
policing.  
Many disentanglement policies also seek to address 
discriminatory barriers to accessing police services. When local law 
enforcement officials are involved in federal immigration policy, 
policing practices can discourage immigrants and individuals in mixed 
status families from cooperating with the police as victims of or 
witnesses to crime.87 
Beside the Fourteenth Amendment,88 which bars state officials 
from intentional discrimination (based on, inter alia, race, ethnicity, 
 
v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305 at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 4, 2014). 
 82.  See, e.g., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Issues Bulletin to Law Enforcement on 
Federal Immigration Detainers (June 25, 2014), https://www.oag.ca.gov/news/press-
releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-issues-bulletin-law-enforcement-federal. 
 83.  Lasch et al., supra note 10, at 1760 (citing Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143 
(Mass. 2017)). 
 84.  Id. at 1764-65. 
 85.  Id. at 1767.  
 86.  See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1545-47 (2011) (discussing the use of race as a proxy for citizenship). 
 87.  Lasch et al., supra note 10, at 1768. 
 88.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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nationality, an alienage),89 Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
prohibits discrimination in state and local federally funded programs.90 
Moreover, states and localities often have their own antidiscrimination 
protections. 
5. Encouraging Diversity and Inclusivity  
A fifth basis for sanctuary policies—which is also centered more 
directly on the human rights of immigrants—is promoting inclusive 
and diverse communities.91  For example, the sanctuary policies in 
Santa Monica, California reflects these concerns.92  President Trump 
has made numerous statements and supported policies that are viewed 
as undermining inclusivity and even racist.  In response to what Santa 
Monica’s mayor described as steps by the Trump administration that 
failed to “align with our vision of diversity and inclusion,”93 the city 
adopted a 2017 resolution that rooted a new policing policy in the 
city’s embrace of diversity based on religion, race, national or ethnic 
origin, gender, and sexual identity or orientation.94 
Promoting inclusive and diverse communities “is related to but 
distinct from the more legalistic emphasis on equality and 
nondiscrimination that is seen in some disentanglement policies.”95 
The goal of inclusivity is more forward-looking, in contrast to the 
backward-looking goal of remediating past discriminatory practices in 
the criminal justice system and in police services.96  
C. The Treatment of Immigrants as a Tipping Problem 
Just as not all climate change mitigation steps taken by particular 
jurisdictions may be viewed as primarily climate policy per se—but 
rather as co-benefits—so too sanctuary jurisdictions adopt policies are 
based on a number of grounds. Sanctuary policies framed in more 
 
 89.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding discrimination 
against persons of Japanese ancestry to be presumptively unconstitutional, though upholding 
the internment of such persons); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) 
(determining that state classifications based on alienage “are inherently suspect and subject to 
close judicial scrutiny”). 
 90.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  
 91.  Lasch et al., supra note 10, at 1766-70.  
 92.  Id. at 1769. 
 93.  Ted Winterer, An Open Letter from Santa Monica Mayor Ted Winterer on Diversity 
and Immigration, SANTA MONICA NEXT (March 1, 2017), 
http://www.santamonicanext.org/2017/03/an-open-letter-from-santa-monica-mayor-ted-
winterer-on-diversity-and-immigration/. 
 94.  Lasch et al., supra note 12, at 1769-70. 
 95.  Id. at 1769. 
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pragmatic terms—and that build alliances with law enforcement—may 
have greater appeal in red and purple localities states.  
While the first wave of sanctuary policies involved religious 
leaders who sought to actively prevent federal immigration officials 
from deporting Central American refugees who faced persecution at 
home, “[t]oday’s sanctuary laws, while bearing the same name, are 
markedly different.”97  Rather than blocking federal action, today’s 
sanctuary jurisdictions are simply stepping aside so that they will not 
be involved in federal immigration policy at all.  Asserting its interest 
in local sovereignty and criminal justice, California’s attorney general, 
Xavier Becerra, has noted, “California is in the business of public 
safety, not in the business of deportations.”98   
Even while often framed in pragmatic terms, these policies have 
the effect of responding to the intimidation, exclusion, and humiliation 
of federal immigration policy.  While these sanctuary jurisdictions do 
not have the power, nor are they necessarily seeking to provide legal 
citizenship to undocumented immigrants, these policies often 
demonstrate the importance of factors beyond legal citizenship, 
including broader norms of inclusion, equality, family unification, 
respect, and dignity.99 
 
CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in the acknowledgement at the outset of this essay, 
as this goes to press, the COVD-19 pandemic has ravaged 
communities across the world, posing enormous challenges for 
governance at every level. While this essay was written prior to the 
pandemic and cannot able to account for these challenges, I add these 
concluding remarks as a postscript for future lines of research. 
As regards COVID-19 relief for immigrants, the federal relief 
provided pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security Act (CARES Act) and Families First Coronavirus Response 
Act contain provisions excluding undocumented workers and mixed-
status families from eligibility for COVID-19 stimulus checks and 
 
 97.  Peter L. Markowitz, Trump Can’t Stop the Sanctuary Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/opinion/trump-california-sanctuary-
movement.html. 
 98.  Id.   
 99.  Jennifer M. Chacón, Citizenship Matters: Conceptualizing Belongings in an Era of 
Fragile Inclusions, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2018). 
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coverage of coronavirus testing.100 However, a few state and local 
governments have stepped forward to provide various forms of relief 
to many of these workers and families.101 
As for climate policy, while COVID-19 has reduced auto-
emissions, the United Nations reports that this reduction alone will not 
stop climate change.102 Meanwhile, just as President Trump has taken 
steps to withdraw from the Paris climate accord, he has also threatened 
to cut U.S. funding to the World Health Organization (WHO). 
In light of these preliminary observations—as well as the 
significant role of states and cities in responding to the health crisis 
more broadly—additional research on the links between glocalization 
and federalism would be valuable.103 
 
 
100 Rosio Perez, My immigrant parents lost their jobs, but the CARES Act won’t help mixed-
status families like mine, LA Times (May 3, 2020) (noting relief provided by Chicago Mayor 
Lori Lightfoot, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio, and California Governor Gavin 
Newsom), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-05-03/undocumented-immigrants-
cares-act-coronavirus-covid.   
101 Id.   
102 UN News, Fall in COVID-linked carbon emissions won’t halt climate change—UN 
weather agency chief  (April 22, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1062332.  
103 See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Quarantined: Federalism in Action at Home and Abroad, 
Think Global Health (March 2, 2020), 
https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/quarantined-federalism-action-home-and-abroad. 
